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Innocence Amid "LUST":1 
The Innocent Buyer and Leaking Underground 
Storage Tanks Containing Petroleum 
Kevin R. Duncan* 
B. Todd Bailey** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Petroleum products have been stored in underground 
storage tanks (U8Ts)2 since the 1950s.3 These products are 
stored in USTs primarily for safety reasons.4 However, with 
the passage of time, many USTs have developed leaks and 
have spilled their contents into the surrounding soil and 
underlying groundwater. Contamination of our groundwater 
has been called a problem of "national significance"5 which 
* Kevin R. Duncan is a Washington attorney and a principle in the Seattle 
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software for the legal profession. Mr. Duncan has an M.A. in Tax and a J.D. from 
Brigham Young University in 1991, and is a member of the Washington bar. 
** B. Todd Bailey will receive his B.S. and MAce. from the J. Willard & Alice 
S. Marriott School of Management, and is a candidate for graduation from the J. 
Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University in 1993. 
1. The acronym "LUST" was originally used by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) as the designation for "leaking underground storage tanks." However, 
"[c]ognizant in this era of new morality that '[h]ell has three gates, lust, anger, 
and greed,' EPA ... changed its LUST program to 'UST.'" MICHAEL L. ITALIANO 
E'1' AL., LIABILITY FOR STORAGE TANKS 1 (2d ed. 1992) (quoting BHAGAVAD G!TA 
(THE SONG OF GoD) 16 (P. La!. trans.)). The abbreviation "UST" will be used 
throughout this paper; however, the acronym "LUST" is used in the title in order 
to sound more alluring to prospective readers. 
2. For purposes of this article, an "underground storage tank" is a tank 
system, including its piping, that has at least 10 percent of its volume beneath the 
surface of the ground. See 42 U.S.C. § 6991(1) (1988). 
3. Katherine S. Yagerman, Underground Storage Tanks: The Federal Program 
Matures, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,136, 10,136 (Mar. 1991). 
4. ld. "The safety reasons relate to fire and explosion hazards. Obviously, 
environmental contamination from leakage was overlooked as a safety concern." ld.; 
see also U.S. EPA Pub. EPA/530/UST-88-0088, MUSTS FOR USTs 1 (Sept. 1988) 
[hereinafter MUSTS FOR USTs] ("Leaking USTs can cause fires or explosions that 
threaten human safety."). 
5. HAzARDOUS AND SOLID WASTE AMENDMENTS OF 1984, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 
245 
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"has the potential to deplete one of our most precious natural 
resources."6 This is of particular concern because fifty percent 
of Americans rely on groundwater for their drinking water. 7 
Moreover, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
estimates that a leak of one gallon of gasoline can contaminate 
the water supply of 50,000 people.8 
The EPA estimates that there are as many as 2 million 
USTs at 750,000 facilities nationwide.9 Approximately eighty 
percent of those tanks are made of bare steel. 10 The EPA 
estimates that as many as twenty-five percent of these tanks 
are leaking11 due largely to corrosion of the bare steel. 12 The 
Conference Report on the Hazardous and Solid Waste 
Amendments of 1984 indicated that 75,000 to 100,000 USTs 
were leaking and projected that as many as 350,000 USTs 
could develop leaks within the next five years. 13 
1133, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 128 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5699 
[hereinafter HSWA CONF. REP.]. 
6. Rep. Don Ritter, Foreword to ITALIANO ET AL., supra note 1, at xxiii. 
7. MUSTS FOR USTs, supra note 4, at 1; HSWA CONF. REP. supra note 5 at 
128. 
8. ITALIANO ET AL., supra note 1, at 3, 4 (citing EPA, Underground Motor Fuel 
Storage Tanks: A National Survey (1986)). 
9. HSWA CONF. REP., supra note 5, at 128. 
10. Underground Storage Tank Program, 1991: Hearings on Subtitle I of the 
Solid Waste Disposal Act Before the Subcomm. on Transp. and Hazardous Materials 
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1991) 
[hereinafter 1991 Hearings on UST Program] (statement of Rep. AI Swift, 
Chairman, Subcomm. on Transp. and Hazardous Materials); see also 52 Fed. Reg. 
12,662, 12,664 (1987) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 280). 
11. MUSTS FOR USTs, supra note 4, at 2. An EPA survey estimated that 18 to 
35 percent of USTs are leaking. ITALIANO ET AL., supra note 1, at 3 (citing EPA, 
Underground Motor Fuel Storage Tanks: A National Survey (1986)). Thirty-five 
percent of non-farm USTs storing petroleum proved to be "non-tight"-i.e., they 
were not completely sealed and were possibly leaking their contents. 52 Fed. Reg. 
12,662, 12,665 (1987) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 280) (discussing EPA, 
Underground Motor Fuel Storage Tanks: A National Survey (1986)). 
12. Yagerman, supra note 3, at 10,137. 
13. HSWA CONF. REP., supra note 5, at 128. The following estimates are 
illustrative of the magnitude of the problem presented by leaking USTs: 
As of January 1991, the EPA is aware of 95,000 confirmed UST leaks 
nationwide. EPA expects several hundred thousand more leaks to be 
detected over the next few years as the UST leak detection requirements 
are phased in. For comparison purposes, there are approximately 1200 
Superfund sites slated for cleanup, less than 5000 RCRA [Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act] hazardous waste management facilities 
requiring cleanup, and 30,000-plus listings in the EPA's database of known 
toxic waste dumpsites. 
1991 Hearings on UST Program, supra note 10, at 291 (testimony of Lois N. 
Epstein, P.E., Environmental Defense Fund). 
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Facilities which commonly use USTs for petroleum storage 
include not only gasoline stations, but also taxi companies, 
rental car agencies, fire departments, post offices, marinas, 
airports, and construction companies. 14 Many of these 
facilities have aging USTs made of bare steel. 15 The EPA 
estimates that the failure rate for such tanks due to corrosion 
depends largely on the age of the tank. 16 Failures for the bare 
steel tanks begin when they are ten to twenty years old, and is 
significantly greater for tanks over twenty years old. 17 An 
EPA study found that approximately one third of the existing 
USTs used to store petroleum are over twenty years old or are 
of unknown age. 18 
The total number of USTs and the number of leaking USTs 
is particularly alarming when the cost of cleaning up a single 
spill is considered. Cleanup costs for a single site range from 
$20,000 to $1 million. 19 The average cost rose from $85,000 in 
1989 to $135,000 in 1990.20 Many owners of USTs may not be 
able to afford the cost of cleaning up a petroleum spill from 
their USTs. The median motor fuel outlet in 1987 had $90,000 
in net worth, $210,000 in assets, and $14,000 in annual after-
tax profits21-hardly a deep pocket. Furthermore, many of 
these fuel outlets cannot afford pollution liability insurance 
since the premiums for such insurance have ballooned in the 
past several years. 22 
Due to the sheer number of USTs in the United States, a 
purchaser of property might discover-after closing a deal and 
14. ITALIANO ET AL., supra note 1, at 2. 
15. See supra text accompanying note 10. 
16. 53 Fed. Reg. 37,082, 37,088 (1988). 
17. !d. 
18. 52 Fed. Reg. 12,662, 12,664 (1987) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 280) 
(discussing EPA, Underground Motor Fuel Storage Tanks: A National Survey 
(1986)). A study of USTs in Ohio revealed that approximately 15 percent of tanks 
fail after 15 years, and 70 percent of service station tanks failed after 20 years. 
ITALIANO ET AL., supra note 1, at 252-53 (citing POLLUTION LIABILITY INSURANCE 
ASSOCIATION, RISK EVALUATION GUIDE FOR BULK LIQUID STORAGE TANKS (1984)). 
19. 1991 Hearings on UST Program supra note 10, at 4 (statement of Rep. AI 
Smith, Chairman, Subcomm. on Transp. and Hazardous Materials). 
20. !d. at 4. 
21. 52 Fed. Reg. at 12,671. 
22. Ethel S. Hornbeck, 1991 Joint Survey of C.asoline Marketer Underground 
Storage Tank Activity, 2, reprinted in 1991 Hearings on UST Program, supra note 
10, at 205, 206. "Private insurance has become increasingly expensive, placing it 
out of reach for the average marketer .... [O]nly 17 percent of marketers report 
carrying PLI [pollution liability insurance], down dramatically from the 40 percent 
that had a policy one year ago [1989]." !d. 
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acquiring title-that in addition to the property she bargained 
for, she has received one or more undisclosed USTs as a bonus. 
Because state23 and federal statutes24 impose strict liability 
on landowners for the abatement of environmental 
contamination on their land, an innocent purchaser can be 
liable for cleanup costs despite the lack of any culpability or 
involvement with the leak or any knowledge of its presence on 
the land. 25 For this reason, and the fact that removing and 
cleaning up after leaking USTs is so expensive, USTs have 
been called the "scourge of the nation's commercial real estate 
business."26 
This article will focus on the innocent purchaser who has 
acquired property without knowledge of one or more leaking 
petroleum USTs on the acquired property, or without 
knowledge (or reason to know) of petroleum contamination on 
that property from a leaking UST.27 Part II will examine the 
portions of the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act of 
1976(RCRA)28 which govern petroleum USTs, including 
financial responsibility for spills and citizen suits to enforce the 
operative provisions of that statute. Part III will explore the 
impact of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA?9 on petroleum 
USTs. Part IV examines common law causes of action which 
the innocent purchaser may have against the party(s) at fault 
including, but not limited to, the party which sold the property 
to the innocent purchaser. Part V concludes that although 
relief for the innocent purchaser is limited or nonexistent 
under federal statutes, various forms of relief are available at 
23. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3737.89 (Anderson 1989); OHIO ADMIN. 
CODE § 1301: 7-1-28, 7-7-35, 7-7-36 (1989). 
24. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988); Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-699li (1988). 
25. See. e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6991e(d)(2); see also New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 
759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (innocent purchaser held liable for cleanup costs); 
United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103 (D.N.J. 1983) (purchaser liable on the 
basis of property acquisition, without any conduct which contributed to 
contamination). 
26. Underground Tanks Are Budget Busters, Bus. REC., Nov. 9, 1992, at 1. 
27. This general definition is adapted from federal statutory exemption 
provisions in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (1988). A higher standard is placed on 
purchasers in commercial transactions than in residential transactions who assert 
such a claim. H.R. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 187 (1986). 
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988) [hereinafter RCRA]. 
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988) [hereinafter CERCLA or Superfund]. 
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common law. 
II. RCRA AND USTs 
A. RCRA Subtitle I 
Federal regulation of USTs is based primarily on RCRA.30 
Subtitle I of RCRA31 specifically governs USTs. Congress en-
acted Subtitle I to address the problem of groundwater contam-
ination by leaking USTs.32 Subtitle I sets forth the federal 
standards governing USTs. Eight categories of standards are 
enumerated: (1) notification of tank existence,33 (2) leak detec-
tion,34 (3) records maintenance,35 (4) release reporting,36 
(5) corrective action,37 (6) tank closure,38 (7) financial 
responsibility39, and (8) performance standards for new 
tanks.40 Enforcement of these standards may take place at 
both the federal and state levels. 
1. Shared responsibility of the EPA and state programs 
Although Subtitle I is part of a federal statute, states may 
assume primary responsibility for its enforcementY States 
30. RCRA §§1002-11002, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k. RCRA is actually the "Solid 
Waste Disposal Act" but is commonly referred to by its RCRA designation. For a 
general discussion of RCRA, see Randolph L. Hill, An Overview of RCRA, 21 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,254 (May 1991). For a general discussion of the E.P.A. regula-
tions accompanying Subtitle I of RCRA, see Glenn Waddell, Note, A Practitioner's 
Guide to the Recently Promulgated UST Regulations, 41 ALA. L. REV. 487 (1990). 
31. RCRA §§ 9001-9010, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991-6991i. Subtitle I of RCRA was codi-
fied as Chapter IX of the Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA). 42 U.S.C. §§6991-
6991i. In keeping with common usage, the designation "Subtitle I" of RCRA will be 
used throughout this article to indicate Chapter IX of the SWDA. 
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991-6991i; HSWA CONF. REP., supra note 5, at 5699. Prior to 
1984, RCRA did not apply to USTs containing petroleum because they did not 
contain "hazardous wastes". See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5). 
33. RCRA § 9002, 42 U.S.C. § 6991a. 
34. RCRA § 9003(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(c)(1). 
35. RCRA § 9003(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(c)(2). 
36. RCRA § 9003(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(c)(3). 
37. RCRA § 9003(c)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(c)(4). 
38. RCRA § 9003(c)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(c)(5). 
39. RCRA § 9003(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(d). 
40. RCRA § 9003(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(e). 
41. RCRA § 9004, 42 U.S.C. § 6991c. This shared federal-state responsibility for 
enforcement of federal statutes and regulations has been called part of the "new 
federalism," a system in which the federal government delegates authority to the 
states to implement programs fashioned at the national level and through which 
the states receive federal funds for implementing the programs as long as they 
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may submit a UST "release detection, prevention, and correc-
tion program for review and approval" by the EPA.42 A state 
program is approved only if its regulations are "no less strin-
gent than the corresponding requirements" found in Subtitle I 
and in EPA regulations.43 
If a state program receives EPA approval, it will be applied 
"in lieu of the Federal program and the State shall have prima-
ry enforcement responsibility with respect to requirements of 
its program."44 However, if the state program is not yet ap-
proved, Subtitle I continues to apply in addition to any inde-
pendent state or local regulations.45 Thus far, ten states have 
received final approval of their state UST programs: Geor-
gia,46 Louisiana,47 Maine,48 Maryland,49 Mississippi, 50 
New Hampshire, 51 New Mexico, 52 North Dakota,53 
Oklahoma,54 and Vermont.55 Tentative approval has been 
received by N evada56 and Rhode Island. 57 The discussion of 
Subtitle I which follows is relevant only insofar as it has not 
been supplanted by state programs.58 
2. Reach of Subtitle I 
Not all USTs are governed by Subtitle I. The scope of Sub-
maintain the federal standards. Yagerman, supra note 3, at 10,136. 
42. RCRA § 9004(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6991c(a); see also 40 C.F.R. § 281 (1988) ("Ap-
proval of State Underground Storage Tank Programs"). Partial state programs are 
permitted: "The program may cover tanks used to store regulated substances re-
ferred to in 6991(2)(A) [certain hazardous substances] or (B) [petroleum] or both of 
this title." !d. (emphasis added). 
43. RCRA § 9004(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6991c(b) (emphasis added); 40 C.F.R. § 281.30-
281.38 (1988). 
44. RCRA § 9004(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6991c(d)(2) (emphasis added). 
45. Yagerman, supra note 3, at 10,138. 
46. 56 Fed. Reg. 21,603 (1991). 
47. 57 Fed. Reg. 34,519 (1992). 
48. !d. at 24,759. 
49. !d. at 29,034. 
50. 55 Fed. Reg. 23,549 (1990). 
51. 56 Fed. Reg. 28,089 (1991). 
52. 55 Fed. Reg. 38,064 (1990). 
53. 56 Fed. Reg. 51,333 (1991). 
54. 57 Fed. Reg. 41,874 (1992). 
55. !d. at 186. 
56. !d. at 61,376. 
57. !d. at 53,870. 
58. An examination of the UST programs of individual states is beyond the 
scope of this article. For a list of state statutes affecting USTs, see ITALIANO ET 
AL., supra note 1, app. 2, at 404-35. 
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title I has two important delimitations: a definition of the 
tanks which are regulated, and the designation of substances 
within those tanks which are regulated. Once Subtitle I is 
found to apply to a particular UST, the persons who may be 
held responsible for the UST and any spills must be deter-
mined. 
a. Tanks regulated by Subtitle I. Subtitle I governs only 
USTs which meet its definition of USTs. For purposes of Sub-
title I, a UST is a tank (including the underground pipes con-
nected thereto) of which at least ten percent is beneath the 
surface of the ground59 and which is used to contain a "regu-
lated substance" as defined in Subtitle 1.60 Some USTs are ex-
empted from Subtitle I. Exempt USTs include farm or residen-
tial tanks with a capacity of 1100 gallons or less which are 
used for noncommercial purposes,61 and tanks used for storing 
heating oil for use on the premises where the oil is stored.62 
Subtitle l's definition of UST encompasses about 1.4 million 
tanks nationwide.63 
b. Substances regulated by Subtitle I. Some USTs meet-
ing Subtitle l's UST definition still fall outside of the scope of 
Subtitle I due to the type of substances stored in those tanks. 
Subtitle I only governs "regulated substances" which are de-
fined as "(A) any substance defined in section 9601(14) 
[CERCLA section 101]64 of this title (but not including any 
substance regulated as a hazardous waste under subchapter III 
of this chapter), and (B) petroleum."65 Note that petroleum is 
specifically regulated by Subtitle I. In addition, substances 
59. For a definition of "beneath the surface of the ground," see 40 C.F.R. § 
280.12 (1988). 
60. RCRA § 9001, 42 U.S.C. § 6991; see also 40 C.F.R. § 280.12. 
61. RCRA § 9001(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 6991(1)(A); see also 40 C.F.R. § 280.12. 
62. RCRA § 9001(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6991(1)(B). Other types of tanks are also 
excluded from Subtitle I's definition of UST. These include septic tanks; certain 
regulated pipeline facilities; surface impoundment, pit, pond, or lagoon; storm or 
waste water collection systems; flow-through process tanks; liquid trap or gathering 
lines used in oil and gas production and gathering operations; and storage tanks 
located in underground area but above or upon the surface of the floor where it is 
located. RCRA § 9001(C)-(l), 42 U.S.C. § 6991(1)(C)-(I). 
63. 52 Fed. Reg. 12,662, 12,664 (1987). 
64. For a discussion of CERCLA classification of substances as hazardous sub-
stances, see infra notes 126-130 and accompanying text. 
65. RCRA § 9001(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6991(2). 
252 B.Y.U. Journal of Public Law [Volume 7 
which are otherwise regulated by RCRA subchapter 
III-"Hazardous Waste Management"66-are excluded from 
Subtitle I thereby avoiding overlap of these two RCRA chap-
ters. 
c. Persons regulated by Subtitle I. Subtitle I regulations 
focus on owners and operators of USTs.67 An operator is "any 
person in control of, or having responsibility for, the daily oper-
ation of the underground storage tank."68 "Daily operations" 
should exclude unintentional, inadvertent, or passive opera-
tion.69 
The term "owner" is much less straightforward. Subtitle I 
has two definitions of owner which depend upon when a UST is 
"in use": 
(3) The term "owner" means-
(A) in the case of any underground storage tank in 
use on November 8, 1984, or brought into use after 
that date, any person who owns an underground 
storage tank used for the storage, use, or dispensing 
of regulated sustances [sic], and 
(B) in the case of any underground storage tank in 
use before November 8, 1984, but no longer in use 
on November 8, 1984, any person who owned such 
tank immediately before the discontinuation of its 
use.70 
These definitions of an owner are problematic. For example, 71 
suppose a tank in use after November 8, 1984, is found to be 
leaking. Further suppose that the tank has been leaking for 
several years during which time the ownership of the tank has 
changed several times. The definition of an owner of a tank in 
66. RCRA §§ 3001-3020, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939b. Subchapter III regulates 
hazardous solid wastes. RCRA § 3001, 42 U.S.C. § 6921. This portion of RCRA has 
been called "onerous," Randolph L. Hill, An Overview of RCRA, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10,254, 10,257 (May 1991), and was dubbed a "mind-numbing journey." American 
Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., writing 
the majority opinion). 
67. RCRA § 9003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(a). 
68. RCRA § 9003(4), 42 U.S.C. § 6991(4); see also 40 C.F.R. § 280.12 (1988) 
(definition of operator). 
69. Yagerman, supra note 3, at 10,140. 
70. RCRA § 9001, 42 U.S.C. § 6991(3) (emphasis added); see also 40 C.F.R. § 
280.12. 
71. Yagerman, supra note 3, at 10,140. 
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use after November 8, 1984, is phrased in the present tense, 
suggesting that only the current owner of the tank meets the 
Subtitle I definition of owner. This interpretation is partially 
remedied by language in Subtitle I which states that Subtitle I 
liability of an owner or operator of a UST may not be trans-
ferred by conveyance to another person. 72 
The determination of who is the operator or owner of a 
UST is important due to the substantial liability which accrues 
to them for violations of Subtitle I's provisions. An owner who 
knowingly fails to notify the appropriate state or local agency 
concerning the existence of a UST, or who submits false infor-
mation with respect thereto, is subject to a civil penalty of up 
to $10,000 for each tank.73 Failure of an owner or operator to 
comply with EPA regulations and standards under approved 
state programs is subject to a civil penalty of up to $10,000 per 
tank for each day of violation. 74 Owners and operators may 
also be liable for the costs of ''corrective actions"75 incurred by 
the EPA or states. 76 
3. Response to leaking UST 
The responsibility to respond to a leaking UST is shared by 
the EPA (or the analogous state agency in states with EPA 
approved UST programs) and the owner or operator of the 
UST. The initial "corrective action" upon discovering that a 
UST is leaking must be undertaken by the owner or operator. 
The EPA, however, may also commence "corrective actions" 
which are paid for with funds from a trust established for that 
purpose in certain circumstances. 
72. RCRA § 9003(h)(6)(C)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 699lb(h)(6)(C)(i). 
No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agreement or conveyance shall 
be effective to transfer from the owner or operator of any underground 
storage tank or from any person who may be liable for a release or threat 
of release under this subsection, to any other person the liability imposed 
under this subsection. Nothing in this subsection shall bar any agreement 
to insure, hold harmless, or indemnify a party to such agreement for any 
liability under this section. 
RCRA § 9003(h)(6)(C)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 699lb(h)(6)(C)(i). 
73. RCRA § 9006, 42 U.S.C. § 699le(d)(l). 
74. RCRA § 9006(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 699le(d)(2). 
75. See infra notes 77-84 and accompanying text. 
76. RCRA § 9003, 42 U.S.C. § 699lb(h)(6). 
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a. Corrective action. Upon confirming that a petroleum 
UST is leaking,77 the owner or operator must initiate a re-
sponse to the leak within twenty-four hours. 78 The response 
must include reporting the release to the EPA, prevention of 
further leakage, and identifying and mitigating fire, explosion 
and vapor hazards.79 Next, the owner or operator must under-
take a series of abatement measures including removal of any 
petroleum remaining in the tank80 and cleanup of any free 
product in order to prevent further potential damage to ground-
water.81 
The EPA may also undertake "corrective actions" to limit 
damage caused by a leaking petroleum UST.82 In addition to 
undertaking the actions required of owners and operators, 
allowable EPA corrective actions may include temporary or 
permanent relocatiorf of affected residents and the procurement 
of alternative water supplies.83 However, the EPA may under-
take these corrective actions only if such action is necessary "to 
protect human health and the environment" and one or more of 
the following circumstances exists: (1) no responsible and able 
party can be found to clean up the leak, (2) the situation re-
quires prompt attention in order "to protect human health and 
the environment," (3) the owner or operator of the tank refuses 
to comply with an EPA order to undertake the corrective ac-
tions, or (4) "[c]orrective action costs at a facility exceed the 
amount of coverage required by" Subtitle I and, therefore, "ex-
penditures from the Leaking Underground Storage Tank Trust 
Fund are necessary to assure an effective corrective action."84 
77. The steps for investigating and confirming the existence of a leak are enu-
merated in 40 C.F.R. § 280.52 (1988) ("Release investigation and confirmation 
steps."). 
78. 40 C.F.R. § 280.61. 
79. ld. 
80. ld. § 280.62. 
81. ld. § 280.64. 
82. RCRA § 9003(h)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 699lb(h)(2). The EPA is also authorized to 
issue an order requiring compliance with the provisions of Subtitle I. RCRA § 
9006(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 699le(a)(l). In addition, the EPA may commence a civil 
action in federal court seeking an injunction or other appropriate remedy. RCRA § 
9006(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 699le(a)(l). 
83. RCRA § 9003(h)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 699lb(h)(5). 
84. RCRA § 9003(h)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 699lb(h)(2) (emphasis added). 
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b. UST financial responsibility and the UST Trust 
Fund. Subtitle I requires that UST owners or operators dem-
onstrate their "financial responsibility" by proving that they 
have a predetermined "amount of coverage."85 The amount of 
coverage is an indication of a UST owner or operator's ability to 
pay for cleanup of potential leaks of petroleum. Owners or 
operators of USTs used for retail sales must have $1,000,000 of 
coverage; all other owners and operators must have $500,000 of 
coverage.86 The Trust Fund, which is financed through a gaso-
line tax, 87 ensures that sufficient funds will be available for 
cleanup of spills.88 However, these funds are not to be used in 
lieu of the resources to be provided through the . "amount of 
coverage" required of owners and operators. Instead, these 
funds are for cleanup costs which exceed the required cover-
age.s9 
The demonstrated financial responsibility of owners or 
operators plus the Trust Fund resources may appear to be 
available to the innocent purchaser of real estate containing a 
leaking UST. However, Subtitle I does not explicitly provide a 
means for the innocent purchaser to reach the resources of 
former owners.90 Moreover, the resources of the Trust Fund 
are available only to assist owners and operators who have 
demonstrated their financial responsibility.91 These resources 
cannot be reached by the innocent purchaser. 
85. RCRA § 900:~(h), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(h); see also 40 C.F.R. § 280.90-280.101 
(1988). 
86. 40 C.F.R. § 280.93(a). 
87. Yagerman, supra note 3, at 10,143 n.122. 
88. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,322, 43,364 (1988). 
89. ld. The EPA indicated that the "Trust Fund . . . was created to provide 
cleanup of UST releases in particular circumstances. Congress did not authorize its 
use as a financial assurance mechanism. Rather the fund is intended to 'stand 
behind' the owner or operator who has obtained financial responsibility in the 
required amounts." ld. 
90. The EPA is authorized to seek recovery of costs it incurs in the cleanup of 
a spill from a petroleum UST. "Whenever costs have been incurred by the [EPA] 
for undertaking corrective action or enforcement action with respect to the release 
of petroleum from an underground storage tank, the owner or operator or such 
tank shall be liable to the [EPA] for such costs." RCRA § 9003(h)(6)(A), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6991b(h)(6)(A). 
91. RCRA § 9003(h)(6)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(h)(6)(A). 
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B. RCRA Citizen's Suits 
Section 7002 of RCRA permits "citizen's suits" to enforce 
RCRA's regulatory scheme.92 Of the three types of citizen's 
suits, only one is of value to the innocent purchaser of real 
estate seeking reparation of damages from a leaking petroleum 
UST. 93 That type of citizen's suit is based on RCRA section 
7002(a)(l)(B) which provides that a person may commence a 
civil suit on his own behalf 
against any person ... including any ... past or present own-
er or operator of a ... storage ... facility, who has [1] con-
tributed or who is contributing to the past or present han-
dling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any 
[2] solid or hazardous waste [3] which may present an immi-
nent and substantial endangerment to health or the environ-
ment.94 
Section 7002(a)(l)(B) lists three elements of a citizen's suit 
which determine whether such a suit may be maintained: (1) 
contribution, (2) a solid or hazardous waste, and (3) an immi-
92. RCRA § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a). 
93. Two other types of citizen's suits are available. First, RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(A) 
permits an aggrieved party to initiate a citizen suit "against any person ... who 
is alleged to be in violation of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, require-
ment, prohibition, or order" pursuant to the provisions of RCRA. 42 U.S.C. § 
6972(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). The person against whom the suit is filed must 
currently be in violation of the enumerated provisions. RCRA § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 
6972; see also Harris Bank Hinsdale v. Suburban Lawn, Inc., No. 92 C 6814, 1992 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19737, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 1992) (past leak of gasoline from 
a UST did not provide sufficient basis for RCRA citizen suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6972(1)(1)(A)). The suit cannot be based on "wholly past" violations of the 
statute. Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57, 64 (1987) 
(phrase "alleged to be in violation" in the Clean Water Act required showing of 
present, ongoing violation to support citizen's suit). Acts or omissions which oc-
curred prior to the innocent owner's acquisition of the property containing a leak-
ing UST cannot form the basis for a citizen's suit pursuant to RCRA § 
7002(a)(1)(A). Harris Bank Hinsdale, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *5. Therefore, this 
type of citizen suit is ineffectual for the innocent purchaser. 
Second, RCRA § 7002(a)(2) provides that "any person may commence a civil 
action on his own behalf ... against the [EPA] where there is alleged a failure of 
the [EPA] to perform any act or duty under [RCRA] which is not discretionary 
with the [EPA]." 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2). This suit is also of limited value to the 
innocent purchaser. This type of citizen's suit will permit the innocent purchaser to 
compel the EPA to act in its regulatory role. However, it will not enable the inno-
cent purchaser to extract from prior owners or operators the resources or reim-
bursement for cleanup of the leaked petroleum. 
94. RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). 
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nent and substantial endangerment. A federal district court 
considered, in two installments of Zands v. Nelson, 95 whether 
the three elements were present in a case dealing with a gaso-
line leak from a UST. The court's decisions will be considered 
below. 
1. Zands 1: leaked gasoline as a RCRA "solid waste" 
In 1980, plaintiffs Samuel and Sara Zands purchased a 
gasoline service station. Prior to the plaintiffs' acquisition of 
the station, its gasoline tanks leaked large amounts of gasoline 
into the surrounding soil and into the groundwater. The plain-
tiffs claimed that they were unaware of the leakage.96 
The plaintiffs filed suit against various prior owners and 
operators of the station. The plaintiffs' complaint stated various 
causes of action including a claim based on the citizen's suit 
provision of RCRA section 7002(a)(l)(B).97 Both the plaintiffs 
and the defendants moved for summary judgement concerning 
the plaintiffs' citizen's suit.98 The issue of whether a citizen's 
suit under RCRA section 7002(a)(l)(B) could be based on a 
petroleum leak from a UST was one of first impression for any 
federal court. 
The court began by analyzing RCRA's definition of "solid 
waste."99 RCRA solid waste includes "discarded material" 
whether in a solid, liquid or gaseous form. 100 The court noted 
that the RCRA regulations define "discarded material" as mate-
rial which has been abandoned, 101 and that materials are sol-
id wastes if they have been "abandoned" by being "disposed" 
of. 102 The court also noted that the RCRA definition of "dis-
posal" includes "leaking." 103The court recognized that this 
95. 779 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D. Cal. 1991) [ZaruL~ [], 797 F. Supp. H05 (S.D. Cal. 
1992) [Zands II]. 
96. Zands I, 779 F. Supp. at 1257. 
97. ld. 
98. [d. 
99. ld. at 1261·64. The court acknowledged that this definition of solid waste is 
broad, but not so broad as to include materials which are still useful. However, 
the court notes, gasoline which has leaked into the soil is no longer useful despite 
that fact that it once had great utility. ld. at 1262. 
100. ld. at 1261 (citing RCRA § 1004, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1983 & Supp. 
1991)). 
101. ld. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a)(2) (1988)). 
102. ld. at 1261-62 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(b)). 
103. ld. at 1262 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) [RCRA § 1004(3)] (1983 & Supp. 
1991)). 
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chain of definitions was circuitous. Nevertheless, the court 
overlooked this flaw and concluded that Congress intended that 
RCRA's solid waste provisions apply to gasoline leaks from 
USTs. 104 
2. Zands II: ((imminent and substantial endangerment" and 
contribution 
a. ((Imminent and substantial endangerment." In addition 
to reiterating its conclusion from Zands I concerning leaked 
gasoline as a solid waste, the Zands II court proceeded to dis-
cuss whether the "imminent and substantial endangerment" 
and contribution requirements of RCRA section 7002(a)(l)(B) 
were satisfied. The term "imminent and substantial endanger-
ment" is not defined by RCRA. Therefore, the court looked to 
other judicial authority for a definition and adopted the follow-
ing definition: "An 'imminent hazard' may be declared at any 
point in a chain of events which may ultimately result in harm 
to the public. It is not necessary that the final anticipated in-
jury actually have occurred prior to a determination that an 
'imminent hazard' exists."105 The court concluded that a gaso-
line leak could ultimately result in harm to the public. 106 
Therefore, the "imminent hazard" requirement was met. 
b. Contribution. The court noted that "[i]ndividuals are 
104. ld. at 1263-64. The court also stated that the plain meaning of the statute 
was sufficient to conclude that RCRA hazardous waste provisions applied to gaso-
line leakage from a UST. 
(I]t is evident from the plain language of the statute that a plaintiff can 
also prevail in a section 6972(a)(l)(B) [RCRA § 7002(a)(l)(B)] claim by 
showing handling, storage, treatment or transportation of solid waste. More-
over, by referring to RCRA as a "cradle-to-grave regulatory regime," Con-
gress expressed its intent that RCRA apply to: (1) those who create solid 
waste, (2) those who transport or handle it during its life, and (3) those 
who provide a final resting place for it. 
The Court holds that there is not an exception for petroleum in section 
6972(a)(1)(B) [RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B) ]. 
ld. at 1263-64 (footnotes omitted). 
105. Zands II, 797 F. Supp. at 809 (quoting Environmental Defense Fund v. 
EPA, 465 F.2d 528, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). 
106. ld. The amount of gasoline actually leaked from the UST in question was 
in dispute. Plaintiffs' expert claimed that 30,000 to 40,000 gallons had leaked. 
Defendants' expert countered that merely 3,000 to 10,000 gallons of gasoline had 
been leaked. ld. at 808. 
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liable under RCRA without regard to fault or negligence."107 
However, the court points out that the "contributed to" lan-
guage of RCRA section 7002(a)(l)(B) requires a causal relation-
ship between a defendant and the "imminent and substantial 
endangerment."108 Plaintiffs may carry their burden of proof 
concerning this causal relationship simply by proving that a 
defendant owned or operated a gas station: 
[O]wners and operators contribute to the contamination if the 
contamination is the direct result of activities related to the 
operation of a gas station; plaintiff need not prove the specific 
cause of the contamination. Clearly, individuals who own or 
operate gas stations are responsible for gasoline that leaks 
from the piping system or the gas tanks themselves. Indeed, 
the direct relationship between the leakage and the equip-
ment owned and operated for use at the gas station is suffi-
cient to prove the element of "contribution."109 
Furthermore, the court concluded that ( 1) if a plaintiff 
identifies a period of time during which the petroleum leak 
occurred, (2) for which the defendants are strictly liable, (3) 
and if all defendants are joined in the action, (4) but the plain-
tiff cannot prove which of the defendants "caused" the leakage, 
then the burden shifts to the various defendants to prove that 
they are not liable for the damage resulting from the leak. no 
3. Procedural hurdles 
Three additional prerequisites must be met by a plaintiff 
pursuing a section 7002(a)(l)(B) citizen's suit. First, the 
plaintiff must have legal standing to bring the suit. The first 
line of section 7002(a) states that "any person may commence a 
civil action" under that section. 111 However, the legislative 
history indicates that the term "any person" "does not affect 
recognized requirements regarding legal standing to bring a 
case."112 Second, ninety days prior to commencing the suit, 
the plaintiff must give "notice of the endangerment" to the 
107. ld. at 809. 
108. ld. 
109. ld. at 810 (emphasis added). 
110. I d. at 817 ·18. 
111. RCRA § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a). 
112. H.R. REP. No. 198, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 52 (1984), reprinted in 
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5612. 
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EPA, the state in which the tank is located, and the person 
alleged to be in violation of RCRA. 113 The ninety day period 
need not be non-adversarial; a suit by the plaintiff may be 
pending against the alleged violator when the ninety-day notice 
is given. 114 
Third, no action against the alleged violator may be com-
menced if the EPA, "in order to restrain or abate acts or condi-
tions which may have contributed or are contributing to the 
activities which may present the alleged endangerment is ac-
tively attempting to remedy the "alleged endangerment."115 
These attempted remedies may include prosecuting the alleged 
violator, engaging in removal of the solid waste, or obtaining a 
court order to have the violator commence a removal ac-
tion.116 A similar prohibition applies for analogous action 
taken by the state.117 
4. Available remedies 
An innocent purchaser of real estate containing an undis-
closed leaking UST may be able to bring a citizen's suit against 
prior owners or operators of the UST. However, the suit will 
not necessarily yield the remedy sought. Depending upon the 
circumstances, a district court has jurisdiction to do the follow-
ing: (1) to enforce the provisions of RCRA which are allegedly 
violated; (2) to restrain the defendant from causing further 
harm; or (3) to order the defendant "to take such other action 
as may be necessary."118 None of these remedies appears to 
allow a court to award damages to the injured innocent pur-
chaser. In fact, no court has awarded damages under the 
citizen's suit provisions to an innocent purchaser of real estate 
containing a leaking UST. 119 The only relief available is en-
forcement of the RCRA regulations. The innocent purchaser 
must look elsewhere for more complete compensation for dam-
113. RCRA § 7002(b)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(A). 
114. Zands I, 779 F. Supp. 1254, 1259-61 (S.D. Cal. 1991) (plaintiffs permitted 
to amend their complaint to add a citizen's suit pursuant to RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B) 
while the action against the plaintiff was pending). 
115. RCRA § 7002(b)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B). 
116. RCRA § 7002(b)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B). 
117. RCRA § 7002(b)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(C). 
118. RCRA § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a). 
119. RCRA does provide for civil penalties, but these penalties are paid to the 
government. See RCRA § 700l(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6971(a); RCRA § 3008(a), (g), 42 
U.S.C. § 6928(a), (g). 
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ages sustained due to the leaking UST. 
III. CERCLA 
A. CERCLA generally 
CERCLA1 ~0 is a congressional response to the environ-
mental harm caused by improper disposal of hazardous waste. 
Congress enacted CERCLA to respond to public perception of 
the massive problem of inactive hazardous waste sites and 
spills of toxic chemicals. 121 CERCLA established a system for 
governmental response to spills of hazardous materials and 
long-term problems associated with abandoned hazardous 
waste. 122 In addition, CERCLA provides for a "citizen suit" 
whereby private citizens can sue polluters to enforce the provi-
sions of CERCLA and recover for harms they have 
suffered. 123 For instance, the 1986 amendments authorize 
private contribution actions-with a three-year statute of limi-
tations-which allow courts to allocate response costs among 
liable parties. 124 In addition, the citizen suit provision per-
mits any individual to enforce the Act if the government has 
not commenced an action for cleanup. 125 
CERCLA liability hinges on whether a substance is classi-
fied as a "hazardous substance."126 Hazardous substances un-
der CERCLA include substances and pollutants listed in the 
120. CERCLA §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988) [hereinafter CERCLA 
or Superfund]. 
121. ld. at 265. See al~;o H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1980), 
at lK 
122. ld. 
123. CERCLA § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0, (g) (1988). The private right of action 
was added to CERCLA by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act. 
Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) [hereinafter SARA]. Prior to SARA, 
courts interpreted the statute to mean that innocent purchasers could not bring an 
action for recovery of response costs against prior owners unless the property was 
on the National Priorities List. Cadillac Fairview/Cal. Inc. v. Dow Chern. Co., 14 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,376 (C.D. Cal. 1984). The unquestioned policy be-
hind CERCLA and SARA was to "encourage private party cleanups and settle-
ments." S. Rep. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 44 (1986). 
124. SARA § 113(b), (g), and (0. The role of the CERCLA contribution action has 
limited applicability to a purchaser of land whom we have assumed to be totally 
free of wrongdoing. Because it is assumed that no action has yet been brought 
against the purchaser, the present discussion will not pursue this as a potential 
cause of action. 
125. CERCLA § ~HO, 42 U.S.C. § 9659. 
126. CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). 
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Clean Water Act/27 hazardous wastes listed in the Solid 
Waste Disposal Act (RCRA), 128 hazardous pollutants listed in 
the Clean Air Act, 129 toxic substances listed in the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act, 130 and other designated substances. Even 
though a substance is deemed a ''hazardous substance" under 
CERCLA, it may not actually come within the purview of the 
statute. This may occur, for example, due to the CERCLA "pe-
troleum exclusion." 
B. The CERCLA Petroleum Exclusion 
Congress provided broad coverage for CERCLA through its 
definition of hazardous substances. 131 Nevertheless, Congress 
provided for an exclusion from CERCLA coverage: "The term 
[hazardous substance] does not include petroleum, including 
crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise spe-
cifically listed or designated as a hazardous sub-
stance .... "132 In creating this exclusion, Congress failed to 
define the terms "petroleum" and "fraction." This has permitted 
some confusion concerning the applicability of CERCLA to 
spills of gasoline and other petroleum products from USTs. The 
confusion has arisen because some of the common components 
of petroleum-including benzene, toluene, xylene, ethyl-ben-
zene and lead-are themselves listed as CERCLA hazardous 
substances. 
1. The leading case: Wilshire 
In Wilshire Westwood Ass'n. v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 133 
the Ninth Circuit considered the scope of the petroleum exclu-
sion. In 1987, Wilshire filed a complaint against Atlantic Rich-
field alleging a claim for response costs pursuant to section 
107(a) of CERCLA. 134 Wilshire alleged that gasoline contain-
127. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988). 
128. RCRA § 1002-11,012, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991k (1988). 
129. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988). 
130. lfi U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1988). 
131. See supra notes 126-130 and accompanying text. 
132. CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (emphasis added). 
133. 881 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1989). 
134. !d. at 802. Section 107(a) of CERCLA imposes strict liability on the pollut-
er. That section provides in pertinent part: 
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the 
defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
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ing "hazardous substances" including benzene, toluene, xylene, 
ethyl-benzene and lead leaked from a USTs contaminating the 
surrounding soil including soil on land owned by Wilshire. 135 
Wilshire attempted to circumvent the CERCLA petroleum 
exclusion by listing the hazardous substances that are "frac-
tions"136 of gasoline, arguing that these hazardous fractions 
should trigger liability for cleanup under CERCLA regardless 
of their presence in an exempted petroleum product. 137 The 
Ninth Circuit, affirming the decision of the lower court, con-
cluded that CERCLA does not apply to gasoline even though 
some of its component parts or common additives are separate-
ly designated as hazardous substances by this statute. 138 In 
reaching its conclusion, the court considered the plain meaning 
of the language of the exclusion, the EPA's interpretations of 
the exclusion, and the legislative history of the statute. 
The court began its discussion of the plain meaning of the 
petroleum exclusion by reviewing standards of statutory con-
struction.139 In particular, the court pointed out that the in-
terpretation of a statute should be in keeping with the general 
intent of its framers 140 and that its provisions "'should not be 
construed to make surplusage of any provisions."'141 With no 
further analysis, the court held that application of the stan-
dards of statutory construction to the CERCLA petroleum ex-
clusion "requires us to exclude gasoline, even leaded gasoline, 
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance 
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were 
disposed of 
(4) ... shall be liable for-
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person 
consistent with the national contingency plan. 
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2)(B). 
135. Wilshire, 881 F.2d at 802. The court took judicial notice of the facts that 
benzene, toluene, xylene, ethyl-benzene, and lead are CERCLA hazardous substanc-
es and that they are all components of crude oil. ld. at 803. 
136. The court took judicial notice of the term "fraction": a fraction is "one of 
several portions (as of a distillate or precipitate) separable by fractionation and 
consisting either of mixtures or pure chemical compounds." Wilshire, 881 F.2d at 
803 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED (1981)). 
137. ld. 
138. ld. at 810. 
139. ld. at 804. 
140. ld. (citing Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)). 
141. ld. (quoting Pettis ex rel. United States v. Morrison-Knudson Co., 577 F.2d 
668, 67:3 (9th Cir. 1978)). 
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from the term 'hazardous substance' for purposes of CERCLA. 
Any other construction ignores the plain meaning of the statute 
and renders the petroleum exclusion a nullity."142 
Next, the court noted the lack of legislative history. Con-
gress provided virtually no legislative history to accompany its 
enactment of CERCLA. 143 Therefore, the court looked to sub-
sequent legislative "history" for clues conceming Congress' 
intent conceming the petroleum exclusion. 144 To that end, the 
court examined congressional action when Congress had the 
opportunity to amend CERCLA and its petroleum exclusion. 
The court quoted statements from various members of Con-
gress indicating that those members believed that petroleum 
spills were exempt from CERCLA. 145 The court recognized 
that these statements provide some inferential, although "haz-
ardous," indication of the vitality of the petroleum exclu-
sion.146 
Finally, the Wilshire court considered the EPA's interpreta-
tions of the petroleum exclusion. The court indicated that it 
reviewed memoranda from the EPA's General Counsel, as well 
as EPA pronouncements in the Federal Register, interpreting 
the petroleum exclusion. 147 The court did not discuss the con-
tents 148 of the various memoranda and entries in the federal 
142. ld. 
14:-l. ld. at 805. 
144. ld. at 806-08. 
145. ld. at 807. The quotations included such statements as the following. 
"[S]pills of the fuel cannot be cleaned up under the Superfund [CERCLA] law be-
cause it is a petroleum product." ld. (quoting 130 Cong. Rec. S2028, S2080 (daily 
ed. Feb. 29, 1984) (Senator Durenberger introducing the 1984 amendments to 
RCRA)). RCRA should be "amended to address the problem of leaking underground 
storage tanks, including petroleum tanks which are not covered by Superfund." ld. 
(quoting Rep. Strangeland in House debate on the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act of 1986, 132 Cong. Rec. H9572 (Oct. 8, 1986)). And "[t]his bill 
will not diminish the scope of the present petroleum exclusion." ld. at 808 (quoting 
1a2 Cong. Rec. S14,932 (daily ed., Oct. 3, 1986) (Sen. Simpson during SARA de-
bate)). 
146. ld. at 808. 
147. ld. at 808 n.8. 
148. Among the memoranda cited by the court is one dated July 31, 1987. ld. In 
this memorandum, the EPA General Counsel opines that "fractions of crude oil, 
including hazardous substances such as benzene ... must be included in the term 
'petroleum' for that provision to have any meaning. EPA Gen. Coun. Memo. on 
"Scope of the CERCLA Petroleum Exclusion Under Sections 101(14) and 104(a)(2)," 
at fi (July :n, 1987). This memo also explained the EPA's position relative to lead 
additives for gasoline: 
"[P]etroleum" under CERCLA also includes hazardous substances which are 
normally mixed with or added to crude oil or crude oil fractions during the 
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register, but it concluded that "the EPA's interpretation of the 
scope of the petroleum exclusion is entirely consistent with its 
plain meaning and legislative history .... "149 Moreover, the 
court "conclude[d] that the EPA's interpretation of the scope of 
the petroleum exclusion should be accorded considerable defer-
ence, especially because of the virtual absence of contemporane-
ous legislative history."150 
The Wilshire court concluded that the CERCLA petroleum 
exclusion applies to both refined and unrefined gasoline despite 
the fact that certain of its indigenous components and additives 
introduced during the refining process are designated as haz-
ardous substances under CERCLA.151 Accordingly, Wilshire's 
CERCLA claim against Atlantic Richfield was dismissed for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 152 
2. Post-Wilshire developments. 
The Wilshire court suggested that petroleum products 
which contain substances other than their indigenous compo-
nents and common additives would not be excluded from the 
reach of CERCLA. 153 Subsequent courts have reached the 
same conclusion under a variety of circumstances. For instance, 
"waste oil" resulting from cleaning oil tanks did not fall within 
the petroleum exclusion because it contained chromium and 
nickel oxides scraped from the interior of the tanks during the 
cleaning process. 154 Likewise, the petroleum exclusion did not 
refining process . . . . These substances are also part of "petroleum" since 
their addition is part of the normal oil separation and processing operations 
at a refinery in order to produce the product commonly understood to be 
"petroleum." 
ld. For additional discussion concerning the interpretive pronouncements by the 
EPA, see Michael M. Gibson & David P. Young, Oil and Gas Exemptions Under 
RCRA and CERCLA: Are They Still "Safe Harbors" Eleven Years Later, 32 S. TEX. 
L. REV. 361 (1991); Richard J. Denny et al., Contamination From Oil and Gas 
Production: Who Pays for Cleanup? 1990 MIN. L. INST. ch. 6 (proceedings of 36th 
Annual Institute) (July 19-21, 1990). 
149. Wilshire, 811 F.2d at 808. 
150. ld. at 810. Furthermore, Congress granted the EPA considerable discretion 
in administering CERCLA. !d. at 809. This is evidenced by language in CERCLA 
requiring the EPA to promulgate regulations designating and governing hazardous 
substances. !d. (citing CERCLA § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9602(a)). 
151. !d. at 810; see also Bunger v. Hartman, 797 F. Supp. 968, 971-72 (S.D. Fla. 
1992); Niesko v. Emro Marketing Co., 769 F. Supp. 973, 981-83 (E.D. Mich. 1991). 
152. Wilshire, 881 F.2d at 803 n.3. "The district court simultaneously dismissed 
plaintiffs' pendent claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, thereby resulting 
in dismissal of the action." !d. 
153. ld. at 805. 
154. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 755 F. Supp. 531, 539 (N.D.N.Y. 
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apply to waste oil in which the concentration of hazardous sub-
stances increased during use. 155 
However, the petroleum exclusion is not overcome by the 
introduction of all substances to the petroleum. The introduc-
tion of soil which does not contain CERCLA-listed hazardous 
substances will not of itself overcome the petroleum 
exclusion. 156 Instead, the exclusion is overcome by the intro-
duction, or increased concentration of substances which are 
otherwise designated as hazardous substances. 157 
Whether an aggrieved party has a cause of action under 
CERCLA for a leaking UST will depend upon the substance 
leaked. If the UST contained hazardous substances other than 
petroleum with its indigenous components and common addi-
tives, the injured party will not be barred from pursuing relief 
under CERCLA for any harm suffered. If, however, a UST 
contained only petroleum with its indigenous components and 
common additives, the injured party does not have a CERCLA 
cause action against the polluter. 
IV. COMMON LAW LIABILITY 
Since the innocent purchaser will likely not be made whole 
through actions or proceedings based on federal statutes, the 
purchaser should consider various common law remedies. Many 
common law theories may be employed by the innocent pur-
chaser to recoup costs incurred to cleanup the damage caused 
by a leaking petroleum UST. Of course, the applicable theories 
will depend upon the facts of the given case and upon the case 
law of the jurisdiction. The various theories include actions 
arising from the sale of the real estate (e.g., breach of contract 
or fraud), negligence, nuisance, and strict liability. 
A. Actions Arising from the Sales Transaction 
1. A hurdle: caveat emptor 
A legal hurdle jn UST cases involving causes of action 
1991). 
155. New York v. Exxon Corp., 744 F. Supp. 474, 489-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); see 
also Washington v. Time Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 529, 531-32 (W.D. Wash. 1988); 
Philadelphia v. Stepan Chern. Co., 198R U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14219, *3 (E.D. Pa. 
19RR). 
156. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. California (Caltrans), 790 F. Supp. 9R3, 986-87 
(C.D. Cal. 1991). 
157. !d. 
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arising out of a sales transaction has been the doctrine of 
caveat emptor. The Restatement (Second) of Torts summarizes 
this view of vendor liability: "Under the ancient doctrine of 
caveat emptor, the original rule was that, in absence of express 
agreement, the vendor of land was not liable to vendee, or a 
fortiori to any other person, for the condition of land existing at 
the time of transfer .... "158 Some courts have created excep-
tions to the doctrine of caveat emptor and have been reluctant 
to take a harsh stand in environmental cases.159 
However, a recent Third Circuit decision leaves the avail-
ability of common law actions by purchasers against sellers in 
a questionable status. In Philadelphia Electric Co. (PECO) v. 
Hercules Inc., 160 the court held that the seller was not liable 
to the purchaser, PECO, for an alleged nuisance involving envi-
ronmental contamination on the land sold. The court concluded 
that a vendor is liable only for express provisions in the con-
tract of sale. 161 The court stated that 
[i]n the absence of fraud or misrepresentation a vendor is 
responsible for the quality of the property being sold by him 
only to the extent for which he expressly agrees to be respon-
sible .... The theory of the doctrine is that the buyer and 
seller deal at arm's length, each with an equal means of 
know ledge concerning the subject of sale, and that therefore 
the buyer should be afforded only those protections for which 
he specifically contracts. 162 
Mter considering PECO's sophistication in purchases of 
this kind, the court found that PECO's offer price reflected the 
possibility of environmental risks. 163 PECO stands as a 
strong impediment to recovery actions by subsequent purchas-
ers on common law theories. 164 The court was reluctant to 
158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 352 comment a (1977). 
159. See Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 628 (Fla. 1985) ("the tendency of the 
more recent cases has been to restrict rather than extend the doctrine of caveat 
emptor"). 
160. 762 F.2d 303 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985). 
161. ld. at 312. 
162. ld. (quoting Elderkin v. Geister, 288 A.2d 771, 774-75 (Pa. 1972). 
163. ld. at 314. 
164. Care should be exercised when reading cases which discuss the defense of 
caveat emptor. This defense may be an impediment on common law cases, but is 
not a bar to recovery in other types of environmental cases. See, e.g., Smith Land 
& Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988) (caveat emptor 
inapplicable to actions under CERCLA); Sunnen Prod. Co. v. Chemtech Indus. Inc., 
658 F. Supp. 276 (CERCLA case in which court stated the defense of caveat emp-
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hold sellers liable to potentially remote buyers, especially when 
the price reflected a good faith attempt to allocate risks. 165 
2. Contract actions 
A contracts might also provide a basis for a common law 
cause of action if a breach of that contract occurred. Unfortu-
nately, real estate contracts rarely specify a warranty clearly 
enough to impose liability on the seller. 166 Assuming that the 
seller passes good title, an innocent purchaser might claim a 
breach of covenant against encumbrances. However, one court 
has ruled that a claim based on a breach of covenant against 
encumbrances does not extend to hazardous waste. 167 The 
term "encumbrance" is usually associated with liens, mortgag-
es, easements, restrictive covenants and other third party in-
terests in the land. 168 Because the innocent buyer's liability 
for cleanup does not create an outstanding right at the time of 
conveyance, an action based on breach of this covenant is not 
likely to succeed. 169 
If a clear promise was made in a contract and then broken, 
that promise might be a better foundation for a claim for 
breach. For example, a seller might contract to remediate some 
harmful waste if such waste were to appear. In that unlikely 
event, failure to perform such a promise would increase the 
chances of the seller's liability. But a simple "as is" clause in a 
purchase agreement can preclude an action for breach. 170 
Another theory based in contractual terms is an action 
based on unjust enrichment. "A person who has been unjustly 
enriched at the expense of another is required to make resti-
tution to the other."171 The restitution would be equal to the 
excess of the cleanup cost over the value of the land trans-
tor could not be employed to shift liability for environmental contamination from 
the responsible party to an unwitting purchaser). 
165. PECO, 762 F.2d at 314. 
166. Samuel A. Bleicher & Benjamin G. Stonelake, Jr., Caveat Emptor: The 
Impact of Superfund and Related Laws on Real Estate Transactions, 14 Envtl. L. 
Rep. (Envtl. L. lnst.) 10,017, 10,023 (1984). 
167. See United States v. Allied Chern. Corp., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
20,519, 20,520 (N.D. Cal. 1984). 
168. !d. 
169. See Allied Corp. v. FROLA, 30 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1954 (D.N.J. 1989) 
(court refused to recognize a breach of contract action to recover cleanup costs, 
though other common law claims were possible). 
170. See Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Ariz. 1984). 
171. RE&'TATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937). 
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ferred. At least one court has rejected this theory. 172 That 
court held that the purchaser could not recover cleanup costs 
from the prior owner on an unjust enrichment claim because 
the seller received the benefit involuntarily. 173 
Finally, a purchaser might consider bringing an action to 
rescind the transaction completely because of a mutual mistake 
of fact. One court commented that "if there were no representa-
tions of any kind made by the defendants, rescission should be 
granted."174 The court reasoned that mutual mistake would 
exist if neither party were aware of any environmental prob-
lems which would give rise to liability. 175 If petroleum USTs 
are the source of liability, the seller will usually know of such a 
possibility, suggesting that other causes of action would be 
better suited. If the seller did not know of the existence of the 
USTs, then rescission would be one of the only claims cogniza-
ble under common law. 
3. Fraud or misrepresentation 
As the PECO court pointed out, a purchaser may maintain 
an action for fraud or misrepresentation against the offending 
vendor in two situations. 176 First, the fraud can be a positive 
assertion of a false material fact. Second, the seller can pur-
posely conceal knowledge about environmental problems associ-
ated with the property. In both scenarios, even courts reluctant 
to impose liability will probably do so. 177 
For example, New Jersey's Supreme Court recognized an 
exception to caveat emptor for fraudulent nondisclosure in 
State Department of Environmental Protection v. Ventron 
Corp. 178 The court stated that to prove fraudulent conceal-
ment by a seller in a real estate transaction, the buyer must 
prove "deliberate concealment or nondisclosure by the seller of 
a material fact or defect not readily observable to the purchas-
172. County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 30 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1062 (N.D. Okla. 
1989). 
173. !d. 
174. Simon v. Oldmans Township, 497 A.2d 204, 210 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
1985). 
175. !d. 
176. PECO v. Hercules Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 312 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 474 U.S. 
980 (1985). 
177. !d. 
178. 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983). 
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er, with the buyer relying upon the seller to his detriment."179 
In Ventron, the court regarded mercury pollution in soil as 
a latent defect. 180 The buyer knew the purchase involved a 
chemical company, but it did not know of any contamination. 
The seller knew of the contamination but intentionally failed to 
disclose its existence at the time of the purchase. 181 The court 
held that the buyer could recover any decrease in the land's 
market value, the cost of a containment system put in by the 
buyer, and legal fees incurred by the buyer. 182 In addition, 
the court did not hold the buyer liable to the government for 
response costs. 183 
Misrepresentations by the seller, even those without fraud, 
can often provide a basis for liability. 184 The usual remedy al-
lows the buyer to retain the property and receive the difference 
between what the property is worth and what it would have 
been worth without the misrepresentation. However, one court 
has ruled that a seller's superior, even if not actual, knowledge 
makes his nondisclosure tantamount to an affirmative 
statement. 185 Because some courts have accepted the notion 
of a stricter duty to disclose environmental defects, 186 a 
seller's failure to disclose pertinent facts can result in an action 
for damages by the purchaser who relied upon such a misrepre-
sentation. The misrepresentation might be sufficiently material 
to rescind the transaction due to mutual mistake. It might also 
nullify an "as is" clause in the purchase agreement or it may 
even allow the purchaser to receive punitive damages from the 
seller. 
B. Negligence 
Most UST litigation founded on common law principles is 
based on negligence, or on negligence in combination with oth-
er theories including contract, trespass, and nuisance. 187 Neg-
179. ld. at 166. 
180. !d. 
181. !d. 
182. !d. 
183. !d. 
184. RES'I'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525C (1977). 
185. Callahan v. Callahan, 514 N.Y.S.2d 819 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). 
186. See, e.g., Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985) (seller who knows of 
facts materially affecting property value must disclose such facts to potential buy-
ers); see also Ventron, 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983). 
187. ITALIANO ET AL., supra note 1, at 118. 
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ligence, independent of the other theories, will be discussed 
separately. The elements of ordinary negligence include (1) a 
duty to exercise reasonable care, (2) a breach of the duty, (3) 
causation in fact, plus proximate cause, and ( 4) actual harm to 
the plaintiff. 188 
1. Duty of reasonable care 
In order to prevail, a plaintiff must show, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that a defendant had a duty associated 
with a leaking UST. Proof of a leak is irrelevant without a 
showing of such a duty. Some pre-RCRA cases held that a UST 
owner or operator who had no notice of a leak-and who was 
not required by a contract or trade practice to monitor the 
UST-could not be held liable for negligence associated with a 
leak from the tank. 189 
Congress changed this with the enactment of RCRA and 
promulgation of regulations thereunder. RCRA has imposed 
rules concerning UST design, construction, installation, 190 
monitoring191 and leak detection. 192 These rules establish a 
minimum standard of care for tank owners and operators. A 
violation of these rules can constitute negligence per se. 193 If 
plead by a plaintiff, this would shift the burden of proof away 
from the plaintiff and on to the defendant who has violated 
RCRA's regulations. 
2. Breach of duty of care 
Failure to plead a breach of the defendant's duty of care 
can defeat a cause of action based on negligence. 194 The 
breach of the duty occurs when an owner or operator of a UST 
acts, or fails to act, causing damage when an unreasonable risk 
188. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 30 at 164-65 (5th 
ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. 
189. See, e.g., Cooper v. Whiting Oil Co., Inc., 311 S.E.2d 757 (Va. 1984). 
190. 40 C.F.R. § 280.20-280.22 (1988). 
191. ld. § 280.30-280.33. 
192. ld. § 280.40-280.45. 
193. Stafford v. United Farm Workers, 656 P.2d 564 (Cal. 1983); Martin v. 
Herzog, 126 N.E. 814 (1920) (noncompliance with regulations or a permit require-
ment may be prima facie evidence of negligence). However, if the allegedly negli-
gent act or omission occurred before the standard of conduct was established in 
such regulations, courts will be less likely to impose liability for such conduct. De-
partment of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983). 
194. Malone v. Ware Oil Co., 534 N.E.2d 1003 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). 
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of harm is foreseeable and a reasonable person would have 
taken some precautions against the potential harm. 195 Acts 
which lead to an unreasonable risk of harm include improper 
installation of a UST. 196 Omissions which may provide 
grounds for a cause of action in negligence include the failure 
to discontinue use and to repair a UST once a leak is 
discovered. 197 
3. Causation 
Causation requires a showing of both causation in fact and 
of proximate cause. 198 Proximate cause requires that "legal 
responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so 
closely connected with the result and of such significance that 
the law is justified in imposing liability."199 This determina-
tion is made by the court. Causation in fact must be proven by 
the plaintiff. 
Causation can, and generally must, be shown by circum-
stantial evidence. "Circumstantial evidence is crucial in each 
case because direct cause and effect evidence is rarely available 
because of inherent technical difficulties in tracing or replicat-
ing the path of pollutants to groundwater.'>200 Circumstantial 
evidence concerning an unexplained loss of gasoline, combined 
with the fact that a UST has been used beyond its recommend-
ed useful life, has been sufficient to find causation due to a lack 
of direct evidence. 201 
Circumstantial evidence was also sufficient when the fol-
lowing facts were proven: (1) defendant's service station was 
the nearest source of gasoline, (2) a test of one of defendant's 
USTs revealed that it was leaking, and (3) the service station 
had sustained unexplained financial losses during the period in 
question.202 A plaintiff may consider pleading res ipsa 
loquitur in order to meet the prima facie burden of showing 
195. ITALIANO ET AL., supra note 1, at 122 (citing PROSSER AND KEETON, supra 
note 188, at 169, 17 4, 280). 
196. Monroe "66" Oil Co. v. Hightower, 180 So. 2d 8 (La. Ct. App. 1965). 
197. Cooper v. Whiting Oil Co., Inc., 311 S.E.2d 757 (Va. 1984). 
198. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 188, at 265, 273-74. 
199. ld. at 264. 
200. ITALIANO ET AL., supra note 1, at 125. 
201. Socony Mobil Oil v. Southwestern Bell Co., 518 S.W.2d 257, 265 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1974). 
202. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Gaines Petroleum Co., 499 So. 2d 521 (La. Ct. 
App. 1986). 
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causation. Res ipsa loquitur, literally "the thing speaks for 
itself," permits a "rebuttable presumption or inference that the 
defendant was negligent [if the] instrumentality causing injury 
was in defendant's exclusive control, and the accident was one 
which ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence."203 
4. Actual harm to plaintiff 
Failure by the plaintiff to allege actual damages will cause 
a claim based in negligence to fait204 Furthermore, if there 
are no actual damages, there can be no claim of negligence.205 
Prima facie evidence of damages may come from numerous 
sources including medical records. 206 
C. Nuisance 
A leaking petroleum UST may support an action based on 
a nuisance theory. A "nuisance',z07 is the substantial208 and 
unreasonable209 interference with another's use and enjoy-
ment of an interest in property.210 The Restatement (Second) 
of Torts indicates that the interference may arise from actions 
203. ITALIANO ET AL., supra note 1, at 127 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 
1173 (5th ed. 1979)). 
204. PROSSER AND KEETON supra note 188, at 165. 
205. Exxon Corp. v. Amoco Oil Co., 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1897 (4th Cir. 
1989). 
206. Cornell v. Exxon Corp., 558 N.Y.S.2d 647 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). 
207. A nuisance may be either public or private. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 
188, § 86, at 618-19. A public nuisance is an annoyance or inconvenience interfer-
ing with public rights. ld. A private nuisance involves the interference with right 
of an individual, or group of individuals with a closely aligned interest, to the use 
and enjoyment of an interest in property. ld. 
As explained in Philadelphia Elec. Co. (PECO) v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303 
(3d Cir. 1985), an innocent purchaser has no standing to bring an action for public 
nuisance against the seller. Public nuisance is "an interference with the rights of 
the community at large." ld. at 315. To recover under a public nuisance suit, a 
private party must have suffered damages of a kind different from those suffered 
by other members of the public. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(l) 
(1977). The court rejected such a claim in PECO because PECO did not allege an 
exercise of rights common to the general public. PECO, 762 F.2d at 316. The dis-
cussion in this section applies explicitly to private nuisances. 
208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F (1977); PROSSER & KEETON, supra 
note 188, § 88, at 626-30. 
209. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822(a) (1977); PROSSER & KEETON, 
supra note 188, § 88, at 626-30. 
210. REHl'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1977). "Nuisance is the unreason-
able, unusual, or unnatural use of one's property so that it substantially impairs 
the right of another to peacefully enjoy his property." Frank v. Environmental 
Sanitation Mgmt., Inc., 687 S.W.2d 876, 880 (Mo. 1985). 
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which are intentional, unintentional, negligent, reckless, or in-
volve abnormally dangerous activities.211 In fact, commentary 
to the Restatement suggests that pollution of groundwater may 
constitute a nuisance even though such pollution is usually not 
based on intentional conduct "since the course of the waters is 
usually unknown and the actor can thus foresee no more than 
a risk or harm."212 
An interference with another's use and enjoyment of land 
must be substantial to constitute a nuisance. When an interfer-
ence with use and enjoyment "involves a detrimental change in 
the physical condition of land, there is seldom any doubt as to 
the significant character of the invasion."213 If the interfer-
ence involves the pollution of groundwater-a hallmark of a 
leaking petroleum UST-and the pollution has affected the 
rental or market value of the plaintiffs property, the interfer-
ence would be "substantial."214 It follows that the proper mea-
sure of damages is the diminution of rental or market value 
which results from the nuisance.215 
The interference must also be unreasonable. Prosser and 
Keeton define "unreasonable" in a circuitous fashion: the harm 
is unreasonable if "it would not be reasonable to permit the 
defendant to cause such an amount of harm intentionally with-
out compensating for it."216 Courts perform a balancing test 
in making this determination. The seriousness of the harm 
involved is balanced against the utility of the activity or condi-
tion which gives rise to the alleged nuisance. 
The Restatement factors used in weighing the gravity of 
the harm involved include (1) the extent of the harm involved, 
(2) the character of the harm involved, (3) the social value of 
the use or enjoyment involved, (4) the suitability of the particu-
lar use or enjoyment to the locality involved, and (5) the bur-
211. RESI'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1977). The Restatement treats the 
pollution of ground water as unintentional. See id. § 382 cmt. f, § 825 illus. 2, 3. 
Prosser and Keeton advocate the application of the theory of nuisance only if the 
conduct involved was intentional. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 188, § 86, at 
624. 
212. RES"l'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 832 cmt. f, illus. 7; see also Mel Foster 
Co. v. Amoco, 427 N.W.2d 171 (Iowa 1988) (leaking UST constitutes a nuisance 
without the need to show intentional conduct). 
213. RESI'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F, cmt. d. 
214. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 188, § 88, at 627. 
215. Mel Foster Co. v. Amoco, 427 N.W.2d 171, 176 (Iowa 1988). 
216. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 188, § 88, at 626. 
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den on the person harmed of avoiding the harm. :m The Re-
statement factors for evaluating the utility of the allegedly 
annoying activity or condition include ( 1) the social value of the 
activity, (2) the suitability of the activity to the locality in-
volved, and (3) the impracticability of preventing or avoiding 
the invasion.218 
The balancing test is dependent upon the Restatement 
factors as well as the relative weight given to those factors. A 
1932 case219 decided by the Rhode Island Supreme Court il-
lustrates the application of a balancing test similar to that ad-
vanced by the Restatement. The case involved a leaking UST 
at the defendant's oil refinery which was located in an industri-
al area. Petroleum leaked from the UST into the plaintiffs well 
used for drinking water, rendering the water unfit for such use. 
The court, concentrating on the location of the activity and the 
value of the oil refineries in the particular area,220 weighed 
the plaintiffs harm against the utility of the defendant's activ-
ity and ruled that the activity did not constitute a nuisance. 
However, fifty years later, the Rhode Island Supreme Court re-
versed the 1932 decision.221 In performing the balancing test 
in the latter case, the court recognized a shift in public policy 
toward greater regard for protecting the environment. The 
court held that a claim of nuisance could be based on uninten-
tional, non-negligent conduct in cases involving groundwater 
pollution.222 
Note that an action for nuisance may not be maintained by 
the innocent purchaser of real estate against the seller. A claim 
of nuisance does not permit "a purchaser of real property to 
recover from the seller ... for conditions existing on the very 
land transferred."223 Instead, liability for a nuisance rests 
upon a "finding that [the defendant's] conduct violates a pro-
tected interest of the neighbor-plaintiff."224 Furthermore, lia-
217. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828 (1977). 
218. ld. 
219. Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 173 A. 627 (R.I. 1934). 
220. The court stated, in dicta, that in localities where oil refining was not as 
important to the economy, a claim of nuisance would be sustainable without a 
showing of negligence. However, in areas dependant upon oil refining, a showing of 
negligence would be required. Id. 
221. Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244 (R.I. 1982). 
222. Id. 
223. Philadelphia Elec. Co. (PECO) v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 313 (3d Cir.) 
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985). 
224. ld. at 314 n.9 (quoting POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 704, at 320 (1969)). 
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bility continues as long as the nuisance continues.225 
D. Strict Liability 
The theory of strict liability for hazardous activities has its 
roots in the English case, Rylands v. Fletcher. 226 The defen-
dants in Rylands constructed a reservoir on their own land. 
Water from the reservoir leaked into an abandoned mine shaft, 
flowed through the shaft, and flooded the plaintiffs active coal 
mine. Defendants could not be held liable for negligence be-
cause they were unaware of the abandoned mine. They hadn't 
committed a trespass because the flooding was not sufficiently 
sudden and direct. Furthermore, the flooding did not constitute 
a nuisance since it was not offensive to the senses. Neverthe-
less, the English courts were not content to let the plaintiff go 
uncompensated. Therefore, they fashioned a new doctrine 
which would provide the plaintiff some relief. This doctrine, 
sometimes called the rule of Rylands, imposes liability on a 
person who brings on to his land something which, if it es-
capes, could do harm to another's property and which puts the 
land to a "non-natural use."227 
The doctrine of Rylands, which has evolved somewhat, is 
found in section 519 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: 
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is 
subject to liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of 
another resulting from the activity, although he exercised the 
utmost care to prevent the harm.228 
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the 
possibility of which makes the activity abnormally dangerous. 
Extending the doctrine of nuisance to cover vendor·vendee disputes "is particularly 
hazardous in an area, such as environmental pollution, where Congress and the 
state legislatures are actively seeking to achieve a socially acceptable definition of 
rights and liabilities." ld. at 315. Furthermore, "private nuisance law is a means of 
efficiently resolving conflicts between neighboring, contemporaneous land uses." ld. 
at 314. Interestingly, one district court has allowed a private nuisance action 
against a prior owner for cleanup costs by a subsequent buyer to withstand a 
motion to dismiss. United States v. Allied Chern. Corp., 587 F. Supp. 1205 (N.D. 
Cal. 1984). However, in light of recent case law, the district court's ruling seems to 
be atypical. 
225. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840A (1977). 
226. 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), rev'd, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (1866), affd, 3 L.R.-E.&I. 
App. 330 (1968). 
227. ld. For a more complete discussion of Rylands, see John A. Chanin, Note 
62 UN!V. COLO. 1. REV. 365, 383-85 (1991). 
228. RE&"TATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977). 
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The liability arises out of the activity's abnormal danger 
and the risk of harm that it creates to those in proximity to the 
activity. 229 Section 520 of the Restatement lists six factors to 
consider in deciding whether an activity is "abnormally danger-
ous": 
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the per-
son, land or chattels of others; 
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; 
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by exercise of reasonable 
care; 
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common us-
age; 
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is 
carried on; and 
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed 
by its dangerous attributes. 230 
Courts applying the Restatement factors to petroleum 
leaks from USTs have reached differing conclusions. The court 
in Arlington Forest Associates v. Exxon Corp.,231 held that the 
strict liability provisions of the Restatement did not apply to a 
gasoline leak from a service station. The court focused its anal-
ysis on whether the operation of the service station could be 
made safe through the exercise of reasonable care. Absolute 
safety, the court noted, is not required. 232 Instead, the court 
determined that the attendant "risk must be reducible by due 
care to a point where the likelihood of harm is no longer 
high."233 The court concluded that "[m]aintained, monitored, 
and used with due care, underground gasoline storage tanks 
present virtually no risk of injury from seepage of their con-
tents."234 
229. ld., cmt. d. 
2:10. ld. § 520. For a discussion of the Restatement criteria as they relate to 
USTs, see Dennis M. Toft & Stephen H. Bier, N.J. L.J., Nov. 2, 1992, at 20. 
231. 774 F. Supp. 387 (E.D. Va. 1991). 
232. ld. at 390. 
233. ld. 
234. ld. (emphasis added). Other courts have not been as willing to impose lia-
bility under the strict liability theory. A few courts have viewed cleanup costs and 
diminution of property value as injury which is not the type of damages to which 
strict liability attaches. Pinole Point Prop., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. 
Supp. 283, 292, n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (dicta). Second, one court has refused to apply 
the doctrine where other remedies exist. Bagley v. Controlled Envtl. Corp., 503 
A.2d 823, 825-26 (N.H. 1986). Even so, strict liability is an alternative which inno-
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Other courts have applied the Restatement's strict liability 
provisions when USTs are located near residential areas or in 
close proximity to a community's water supply.235 These 
courts have reasoned that placing gasoline USTs in close prox-
imity to residential areas does not constitute common usage. In 
addition, these courts opine that the USTs present a risk of 
contamination of the water supply. One court stated that 
"locat[ing] a large supply of such a highly toxic chemical in 
close proximity to the water supply of an entire community is 
clearly inappropriate."236 Furthermore, the court determined 
that widespread use of such tanks does not diminish their in-
herently dangerous nature: "it is proper to surmise that this 
risk [of a leak] cannot [be] or at least was not, eliminated by 
the exercise of reasonable care."237 Moreover, since there are 
"many hazardous activities which are socially desirable, it now 
seems reasonable that they pay their own way."238 
Plaintiffs should be able to plead strict liability to reach 
assets of a successor in interest to a person who is responsible 
for a petroleum leak from a UST. In T & E Industries, Inc. v. 
Safety Light Corp.,239 the purchaser of land brought an action 
in strict liability against the successor corporation of the pollut-
er. The court ruled that there is no distinction between the 
rights of a successor in title to use land and the rights of a 
neighboring land owner. 240 
V. CONCLUSION 
The ubiquitous petroleum UST presents the possibility of 
enormous environmental hazards. An estimated two million 
cent purchasers might use when few other options for recovery exist. 
235. See, e.g., City of Northglenn v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 519 F. Supp. 515 (D. 
Colo. 1981). In emphasizing the hazard presented by USTs containing gasoline near 
residential areas, the court characterized the defendant's UST as "not merely fuel, 
but a highly volatile, explosive, and toxic substance as well as one of the most 
powerful solvents commonly available." ld. at 516. 
236. McLaughlin v. Time Mkts., Inc., 2 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 41, 42 (June 10, 
1987). 
237. Yommer v. McKenzie, 257 A.2d 138, 140 (Md. 1969). 
238. Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799, 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) 
(spill from a settling pond containing phosphate slimes). For a general discussion of 
strict liability for hazardous enterprise, see William K. Jones, Strict Liability {or 
Hazardous Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1705 (1992). 
239. 3 Toxic L. Rep. (BNA) 424 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988). 
240. ld.; see also Jersey City Redevelopment Auth. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 655 F. 
Supp. 1257 (3d Cir. 1989) (risk is measured not by what polluter knew of risk, but 
by what was known as of time of remediation). 
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such tanks exists. Approximately one-quarter of them are leak-
ing. Because such tanks are used extensively throughout the 
United States at diverse business and residential locations, the 
possibility exists that a purchaser might unwittingly come into 
possession of real estate which contains such a tank or which 
has been contaminated by petroleum leaked by a UST in prox-
imity to that real estate. 
Even though USTs are regulated by federal law, those laws 
provide little relief for the innocent purchaser who purchases 
land containing a leaking petroleum UST. CERCLA is inappli-
cable due to its petroleum exclusion. RCRA is applicable to 
petroleum USTs. Although RCRA does provide a scheme for 
regulating the use of USTs, it provides little relief against 
former owners of real estate containing the leaking UST. 
Various common law remedies may be employed by the 
innocent purchaser. These remedies include actions based on 
the sales contract, negligence, nuisance, and strict liability. An 
innocent purchaser should be able to obtain some relief by 
resort to these common law theories. The relief available will, 
of course, depend upon the facts of each case, which theories of 
relief may be employed, and the extent of available direct and 
circumstantial evidence available to determine the party re-
sponsible for the damage caused by the leaking UST. 
